Eight years after September 11th, sobering warnings remain unheeded regarding the vulnerability of U.S. chemical plants to terrorist attacks. Journalists across the country have repeatedly made their way into more than 80 chemical plants demonstrating the ease with which fence-line security can be penetrated. As President Obama said in 2006, "these plants are stationary weapons of mass destruction spread all across the country."

The potential for fatalities and economic disruption from an attack on one of these plants is staggering. A 2001 U.S. Army Surgeon General study estimated that in densely populated areas 900,000 to 2.4 million people could be killed or injured in a terrorist attack on a U.S. chemical plant in a densely populated area. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), at least 100 chemical plants threaten a million or more people. Chlorine gas is the most common industrial chemical hazard at the 100 highest risk plants. According to the Chlorine Institute, a chlorine gas cloud can drift through a city and remain dangerous for at least 14 miles.

High-tech security cannot ensure against a successful terrorist attack at a chemical plant, but hundreds of communities have already secured their home towns by neutralizing the chemical hazards at local chemical plants. The New York Times reported in April that, "225 industrial plants in this country have switched to using less dangerous chemicals since the 2001 terrorist attacks, lowering the risk that people nearby would be injured or killed by toxic plumes..."

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has now identified 3,400 high priority chemical facilities in the U.S. which put more than 1,000 people at risk. Of these DHS estimates that 272 facilities each put more than 50,000 people at risk.

Clearly these are priority facilities. The day after an attack no one will argue that we should not require the elimination or reduction of these hazards where cost-effective alternatives exist. These alternatives include a wide range of options such as process changes, chemical substitutions, smaller storage facilities or any other measures that will reduce or eliminate the inherent hazard posed by the facility's storage, use or production of an ultra-hazardous substance. This range of options is a far from "dictating" a specific technology as has been claimed by some opponents.

On October 1, 2009, the DHS and EPA testified before Congress urging that pending legislation (H.R. 2868 & H.R. 3258) cover all chemical facilities, including water treatment plants, and require the highest risk plants to convert to safer cost-effective chemical processes where ever feasible.

The largest category of inherently dangerous substances is toxic-by-inhalation (TIH) gases. According to the EPA just four TIH gases account for 55 percent of all categories of processes that threaten communities nationwide. They are:

• anhydrous ammonia - 32.5% (8,343 processes)
• chlorine - 18.3% (4,682 processes)
• sulfur dioxide - 3% (768 processes)
• hydrogen fluoride - 1.2% (315 processes)

These chemical processes deserve high priority because of their prevalent use at thousands of facilities, especially at high threat facilities. Fortunately, there are also widely available safer alternatives for each of these chemicals. For example, the Center for American Progress (CAP) conducted an analysis of EPA's Risk Management Program data and identified 284 facilities in 47 states that have converted since 1999 and have eliminated these risks for 38 million Americans. See the full report.

Notable examples of success stories include

• More than 200 water treatment facilities (including Washington, D.C.) converted to safer alternatives such as ultraviolet light, eliminating the use of chlorine and sulfur dioxide gas.
• Ninety-eight petroleum refineries use safer alternatives to hydrogen fluoride (HF).
• At least 36 electric power plants use safer alternatives to anhydrous ammonia gas such as dry urea.

While the CAP analysis proves the technological feasibility of safer alternatives the pace is ominously slow. CAP estimates that at this rate of conversion, without new regulatory requirements, it will take 45 years to eliminate these hazards.

Furthermore, conversion costs can be amortized over time. The CAP analysis shows that 87% of the surveyed facilities spent $1 million or less and half spent less than $100,000 to convert to safer chemical processes. These costs pale in comparison to the cost of disaster response, relocating communities, personal injury law suits and environmental clean up liability. All of these can significantly impact the financial health of a facility or company.

The use of safer technologies offers a more stable business plan resulting in fewer regulations, potentially zero liability, sustainable profits and longer term job security for employees. Requiring safer technologies also establishes a level playing field that will allow proven cost-effective systems to grow profitably while providing communities safety and security.

The interim 2006 law, which expires on October 4, 2009, actually prohibits the DHS from requiring safer technologies as a security measure and explicitly exempts thousands of chemical facilities including approximately 2,600 waste water and drinking water plants.

Expert Opinions

A 2006 GAO report (GAO-06-150), Homeland Security DHS Is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at Chemical Facilities, But Additional Authority Is Needed concluded that "Implementing inherently safer technologies potentially could lessen the consequences of a terrorist attack by reducing the chemical risks present at facilities, thereby making facilities less attractive targets."

A 2005 Government Accountability Office report (GAO-05-165) identifies chlorine gas and 90-ton chlorine rail cars as "among the top five terrorist-related wastewater system vulnerabilities."

Among the top three recommendations: "Replacing gaseous chemicals used in wastewater treatment with less hazardous alternatives."